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NoTss AND CommEvNras
any device used for transferring the assets, or any part thereof, to one
not entitled to receive them in liquidation, and by transferring the
purchase money to the shareholders so entitled; 8) taxation of any
transfer within an arbitrary time limit of assets to one not entitled to
receive them in liquidation; or 4) legislative repeal or judicial over-
ruling of the doctrine that a distribution in kind is tax-free to the
corporation.23
In conclusion, it is believed that the decision in the Lynch case
places an unnecessary burden on the corporation to liquidate im-
mediately and to show that the sale of the assets was in fact made by
the stockholders and not through the offices of the corporation. In
spite of authority to the contrary it appears that tax avoidance is still
to be reckoned with when an attempt is made to sell the assets of the
corporation. Therefore, one can only conclude that, at least in the
Ninth Circuit, some of the clouds created by the Court Holding Co.
decision still remain.
JAims F. HoGE
EQUITY-CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-
PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT-CERESIA V. MITCHELL
Although contracts in total restraint of trade are void as against
public policy those in partial restraint only, under certain circum-
stances, will be enforced. In determining whether or not to enforce
a contract admittedly in partial restraint only, the courts have de-
veloped certain criteria as to the reasonableness of the restraint. These
include an examination of the subject matter, the nature of the business,
the situation of the parties and the circumstances of the particular
case. Covenants not to engage in a certain occupation or business
must not be wider than reasonably required for the protection of the
business and good will of the promisee, i.e., the employer or vendee.1
However, if the restriction affords unusually wide protection to the
interests of the promisee but does not interfere with the public interest
or impose an undue hardship on the promisor it normally will be en-
forced,2 even though, for example, the restriction extends to an entire
'Note, 63 HAv. L. Bxzv. 484, 493-4 (1950).
'Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S.W. 295 (1926); Owl
Laundry Co. v. Banks, 83 N. J. Eq. 230, 89 AtI. 1055 (1914).217 CJ.S. 630-632 (1939).
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state,3 or, in effect, the entire United States.4 Although the decision is
questionable, the court in Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber5 went so far
as to hold that even what amounted to a general restraint was valid
when it was no more than reasonably necessary to protect the promisee.
However, even though the restraint may afford only reasonably neces-
sary protection as between the contracting parties it will be unenforce-
able if injurious to the public interest, or if it tends unreasonably to
lessen legitimate competition or raise commodity prices.6
Thus, as a general rule, if a covenant is no more than reasonably
necessary for the protection of the parties under the circumstances of
the particular case it will be enforced. If not, it will be invalidated.
It was early recognized that these polarized rules worked undue
hardship. Often the contracting parties while intending to give ade-
quate protection to the vendee or employer unwittingly went beyond
what was reasonably necessary, thus coming in conflict with the public
interest in one way or another. To alleviate the harsh results en-
countered in complete invalidation a new approach was developed.
In Price v. Green7 a London and Westminster perfumer on disposing
of his business agreed not to carry on the perfumer's business in Lon-
don or Westminster or within 600 miles of either. The court held that
though the covenant was unenforceable as an entity it was capable
of severance as to the proposed area. Accordingly the covenant was
enforced as to London and Westminster and invalidated as to the re-
mainder. The court said: "The question, therefore, seems to be one
of construction, whether, from the language used, the covenant be
capable of division."" In England the courts guarded this extension
of the rule with a jealous eye. In Mason v. Provident Clothing & Sup-
ply Co.,9 it was said that the principle of severability ought only to be
applied where the enforceable part of the coverant "is clearly sever-
able, and even so only in cases where the excess is of trivial im-
portance, or merely technical, and not part of the main purport and
substance of the clause."10 In Attwood v. Lamont- defendant agreed,
'Kochenrath v. Christman, 180 Ky. 799, 203 S.W. 738 (1918). For the old
rule, contra, see Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen (Mass.) 370 (1866); Lufkin Rule
Co. v. Fringeli, 57 Ohio St. 596, 49 N.E. 1030 (1898).
'General Bronze Corporation v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N.W. 469
(1932). See also in this connection the English case of Nordenfelt v. Maxra, etc.
Co., Ltd., [1894] A.C. 535, 573.
106 N. Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
17 C.J.S. 632-634 (1939).
'16 M. & W. 346, 153 Eng. Rep. 1222 (1847).
'Id. at 353.
[1913] A.C. 724.
"Id. at 745.
[1920] 2 K.B. 146.
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on termination of his employment as a tailor, not to engage in any of
nine related occupations. The court held the contract severable and
granted an injunction restricted to the tailoring trade. In doing so
they considered but did not follow the Mason case. On appeal12 the
decision was reversed. It was held that the covenant was a single one
for the protection of the plaintiff's entire business, and not several
covenants for the protection of his several businesses, and could not
be severed. 13 The Mason case was applied and followed.
The doctrine of Price v. Green was developed also in the United
States.14 As adopted by the American Law Institute the rule is couched
in the following language:
"Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade in a
bargain has added to it a promise in unreasonable restraint, the for-
mer promise is enforceable unless the entire agreement is part of a
plan to obtain a monopoly; but if full performance of a promise in-
divisible in terms would involve unreasonable restraint, the promise
is illegal and is not enforceable even for so much of the performance
as would be a reasonable restraint."'
Unlike the English, the American courts have not been reluctant to
extend the doctrine of Price v. Green. Thus, in Stanley Co. v. Lago-
marsino,6 where defendant-vendor agreed not to resume the type
business sold, nor the related business of soap manufacture ( in which
he bad never been engaged), within New York or New Jersey, the
court construed the covenant in two ways. As to the prohibition
against manufacturing soap it was held that this restraint was sever-
able, void and unenforceable under the divisibility rule. As to the
territory embraced the court "strained" to place a construction of
divisibility on the covenant, holding that since the covenant stated
"within" New York and New Jersey, rather than "throughout" it could
be interpreted as applying only to those places within the two states
where the defendant had previously conducted his business. Other
courts have likewise "strained" to place a construction of divisibility
'Attwood v. Lamont, [1920] 3 K.B. 571.
" See also, British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Shellff,
[19211 2 Ch. 563.
"' See, Smith's Appeal, 113 Pa. 579, 6 At. 251 (1886); General Bronze Corp.
v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N.V. 469 (1932); Trenton Potteries Co. v.
Olyphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 At. 723 (1899); Thomas v. Miles, 3 Ohio St.
275 (1854) (restriction in "said city or elsewhere"); Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St.
520 (1853) (restriction in . . . the county of Hamilton, in the State of Ohio, or
any other place in the United States . . ." This was held valid as to Hamilton
County); Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66 (1884); Oregon Steam Navigation
Corp. NV. Winsor, 87 U. S. 64 (1873) (restriction held divisible as to time).
RtESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcTs, sec. 518 (1932).1053 F. 2d 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
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on covenants under consideration.' 7 Beyond this, however, the great
majority of courts have refused to proceed. Indeed, the line is usually
drawn at the point beyond which it would be necessary to "strain" the
meaning of the language employed.
Suppose a situation where some protection for the vendee of a
going concern unquestionably is required, but the parties in drafting
their covenant frame it in indivisible terms and it is clearly unreason-
able as to time, space or subject matter. The question immediately
arises as to whether the entire covenant should be struck down thus
leaving the vendor free, if he so chooses, to operate a competing busi-
ness next door to the one conveyed. The majority rule is ordinarily
stated in these terms:
"A restrictive covenant which contains or may be read
as containing distinct undertakings bounded by different limits of
space or time, or different in subject matter, may be good as to part
and bad as to part. But this does not mean that a single covenant may
be artificially split up in order to pick out some part of it that can be
upheld. Severance is permissible only in the case of a covenant which
is in effect a combination of several distinct covenants." [Writer's
italics]'
The court cannot create a new agreement for the parties' 9 and thereby
uphold the contract in part when the severable character of the agree-
ment is not determinable from the contract itself.2 0
Although a majority of American jurisdictions refuse to enforce an
unreasonable covenant to any extent if it is indivisible, a few, with
Massachusetts pioneering, have begun "artificially splitting up" such
covenants, when they are clearly indivisible, and enforcing them
either as to time, space or subject matter according to what the court
considers reasonable. Thus, in Edgecomb v. Edmonston2' where de-
fendant covenanted that on termination of employment as stenog-
rapher he would not, without plaintiff's consent, engage in business
similar to plaintiffs within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the
covenant was clearly indivisible as to space, involving the entire state,
and such a wide restriction was not necessary for plaintiff's protection.
The court enjoined defendant from engaging in any business similar
to plaintiff's in Boston and from soliciting the plaintiff's customers
I See Fleckenstein Bros. v. Fleckenstein, 76 N. J. L. 613, 71 Ad. 265 (1908);
Trenton Potteries Co. v. Olyphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 At. 723 (1899);
Edwards v. Mullin, 220 Colo. 379, 30 P. 2d 997 (1934).
'
8 POLLOCK, CoNTACs 327 (12th ed. 1946).
Although reformation will ordinarily be permitted in equity for fraud or
mistake, in the usual covenant involved in these cases neither is present.
' See Buckelew v. Martins, 108 N. J. L. 339, 156 Atl. 436 (1931).
' 257 Mass. 12, 153 N.E. 99 (1926).
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within the Commonwealth. It said that this was a reasonable result
and more in harmony with public policy than to declare the entire
covenant void as unreasonable.22
In the recent Kentucky case of Ceresia v. Mitchell23 the Court of
Appeals has adopted this so-called Massachusetts or minority view.24
The appellant Ceresia sold his produce business and leased the build-
ings in Muhlenberg County, Kentucky, to appellee Mitchell. Included
in the contract of sale was a covenant which prohibited appellant, his
children and his executors and administrators, forever from engaging
"in any kind of business of whatsoever kind, character or nature in his
own name or in the name of any other person or persons with him as a
silent partner in the County of Muhlenberg and State of Kentucky."
[Writer's italics] The reputation, good will and influence of the ap-
pellant were acknowledged as forming "a most valuable part of the
property" sold. It is thus apparent that this contract was unreasonable
as to time and space as well as subject matter.
The Court quoted freely from the works of Professor Corbin on
Contracts in upholding the lower court's decision enjoining appellant
for the term of the lease from engaging in competition with appellees
in Central City or Muhlenberg County, Kentucky, and refusing to
' For similar cases, see Whiting Milk Co. v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179
N.E. 169 (1931); Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N.E. 856(1935); Hill v. Central West Public Service Co., 37 F. 2d 451 (C.C.A. 5th 1930).
"242 S.W. 2d 359 (Ky. 1951).
" Perhaps at this point should be noted the 1930 Kentucky case, Davey Tree
Expert Co. v. Aekelbein, 233 Ky. 115, 25 S.W. 2d 62. Here the defendant
covenanted not to engage in tree surgery similar to that performed while in
plaintiff's employ, after termination of the employment, at any place in the U. S.
or Canada within a radius of 100 miles of any city where plaintiff may have been
at any time operating an office. The court held that this negative covenant was
not too unreasonable and enjoined defendant from working within 100 miles of
Cincinnati, Ohio, or Louisville, Ky. The exact holding of the court is rather difficult
to determine. They apparently say that the covenant is not unreasonable, which
would seem to preclude any further discussion of divisibility, etc. They then
quoted however, from the opinion of Judge Dietzman of the Court of Appeals in
regard to a motion to discharge the temporary injunction in the case. Judge
Dietzman had said the covenant was too harsh since the plaintiff did not need
protection to that extent. He then recommended that since it was capable of
division it should be enforced as to oaly the two cities mentioned. He then con-
tinued: "The Mass. rule coincides with what the business world, both that of the
employer and that of the employee; would deem a reasonable and just interpreta-
tion. Parties ought not to be left to the hazard of having their contracts held valid
depending on the varying views different courts might take of the reasonableness
of the covenant. The whole includes the part, and if the covenant is broad, there
is no reason why the parties should not receive protection to the extent of the
reasonable part included in the whole." The court adopted these views and
also specifically declared the Mass. rule to be "a sound and safe rule." It would
appear, therefore, that while not actually applying the majority or minority rule(since the Court held the covenant to be reasonable), the court in its dictum laid
the groundwork for its subsequent decision adopting the minority view in the
Ceresia case.
KENTuGKy LAW fouRNA-
enforce the covenant in full. It approved Corbin's statement that
"'Divisibility' is a term that has no general and invariable definition;
instead the term varies so much with the subject-matter involved and
the purposes in view that its use either as an aid to decision or in the
statement of results tends to befog the real issue."25
What the Court did here amounted to a virtual rewriting of the
contract according to what the majority of the Court considered reason-
able. The intent of the parties, as gleaned from their written agree-
ment, was completely unrecognizable in the finished product produced
by the Court. The time restriction was changed from "forever" to
"until the expiration of the lease." The area comprised was changed
from "the county of Mublenberg and State of Kentucky" to the "city
of Central City and county of Muhlenberg." The subject matter from
.any kind of business of whatsoever kind" to any business "in com-
petition with appellees."
It is not an easy task to determine which view is more sound.
Professor Williston, at the time the Restatement of Contracts was
written,26 adopted the majority view therein contained. He has since,
however, changed his position. He now says that questions involving
legality of contracts should not depend on the mere form of wording
but rather upon the reasonableness of giving effect to the indivisible
promise to the extent that would be lawful.
A primary, and practical, objection to partially enforcing indivisible
promises is that it tends to encourage employers and vendees pos-
sessing superior bargaining power over that of their employees and
vendors to insist upon unreasonable and excessive restrictions with the
expectation that, for one reason or another, no litigation will ever arise.
If it should, then the covenant will in any event be upheld to some
extent. In stressing this practical consideration, at least in employment
contracts, Moulton, J., in Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co.27
said:
"It would in my opinion be pessimi exempli if, when an
employer had exacted a covenant deliberately framed in unreasonably
wide terms, the Court were to come to his assistance and, by applying
their ingenuity and knowledge of the law, carve out of this void
covenant the maximum of what he might validly have required. It
must be remembered that the real sanction at the back of these
covenants is the terror and expense of litigation, in which the servant
is usually at a great disadvantage, in view of the longer purse of his
master."z'
'242 S.W. 2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1951).
Supra, note 16.
[1913] A.C. 724.
Id. at 745.
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Professor Williston says this objection can be overcome, in part at
least, by completely invalidating covenants unreasonable and oppres-
sive, whether severable or not, where it is apparent that the restrictions
were deliberately unreasonable. It is submitted, however, that in a
great majority of cases it would be purely arbitrary to hold that any
promise secured was deliberately unreasonable and oppressive. The
purchaser or employer can usually show a justification, at least in his
own mind, for the promise exacted. Indeed, it may even be argued
that the mere fact that a promise is unreasonable shows that it was a
deliberate attempt at oppressiveness since a "reasonable man" should
have known that such protection was unwaranted.
A further objection is that of where to draw the line if partial en-
forcement is allowed. Every court will vary in its opinion of what is
reasonable and just. While, as in the Ceresia case, the Kentucky Court
re-wrote the contract so as to constrict the area of restriction from the
State of Kentucky to Central City and Mublenberg County, another
court could, under identical reasoning, limit the restriction merely to
Central City or to a radius of four blocks from the location of the
business conveyed, etc. Consider a recent Massachusetts case 29 where
the defendant-vendor of a bakery business agreed not to engage di-
rectly or indirectly in a competing business for a period of seven years
within a radius of seven miles of Boston. The court enjoined the de-
fendant for a period of four years within a radius of four miles of
Boston. Should the parties be required to surrender their bargained-
for concept of what protection is reasonably required for the opinion
of a particular court at a particular time? It would seem not, unless
the restriction is clearly unreasonable. Judges should decide individual
cases in the light of objective rules. Otherwise the decision is too apt
to depend upon the whim of the presiding judge-or the cumulative
whim of the appellate court. The application of an objective rule may
result in a harsh decision in a particular case but it will reach justice
more often in the great majority of cases. It is upon that principle
that the law insists upon objective rules.
It would seem, then, that in these cases such restrictions should be
enforced if not clearly unreasonable; if they are clearly unreasonable
they should not be "partially" enforced unless the covenant is reason-
ably divisible. The only area of conflict in the operation of these rules
would present itself in the latter situation, where the covenant is
clearly unreasonable but is not divisible. It there becomes necessary
to weigh the benefits gained from partial enforcement against the
I Thomas et al. v. Parker, 98 N.E. 2d 640 (Mass. 1951).
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cumulative disadvantages of allowing the courts, in effect, to rewrite
contracts for the parties involved. In addition to the disadvantages
already listed, what would prevent the courts (if the minority view
prevailed) from extending the area of covenants they would partially
enforce from the present category of those "clearly unreasonable" to
those only bordering on the unreasonable or, in some instances, to
those now universally held to be reasonable? It is submitted that the
benefits to be gained from partial enforcement in isolated cases is far
outweighed by the disadvantages inherent in any rule which would
give the courts power ultimately to destroy the sanctity of contracts in
a great many situations.
In the light of these observations it would appear that the decision
in the Ceresia case is erroneous.
J~m~s S. Kosms
